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COMES NOW, Defendant, Rogelio Mora Virgen, by and through
his attorneys, Robert L. Booker and Christopher T. Beck and the
law firm of BOOKER & ASSOCIATES, and hereby submits Appellant's
Opening Brief.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(f) provides this Court's
jurisdiction over this appeal, which appeal is from the final
order of the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Kane
County, State of Utah entered on January 6, 1998.

Counsel for

Mr. Virgen filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 1998.

STATEMENT OF THIS ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the purported "'inventory search" conducted by Officer

Whitaker simply a pretext to conduct an investigatory search of
Appellant's vehicle in violation of the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution?
2.

Did Trooper Whitaker have probable cause to conduct a

warrantless search of Appellant's vehicle?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

May 6, 1996 Appellant was charged in a four count

information alleging the following crimes: (1) possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute; (2) operating a motor
vehicle without owner's or operator's security; (3) no
registration; and (4) exceeding the maximum speed limit.
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Thereafter, Appellant made a motion to suppress the
evidence.

A suppression hearing was held on March 21, 1997.

The motion was denied and on January 6, 1998, Appellant entered
a conditional .plea of guilty on the charge of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute and preserved his right to
appeal the denial of the motion to suppress evidence.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 5, 1996, Trooper Russell K. Whitaker, a certified
peace officer with the Utah Highway Patrol, was patrolling on
U.S. 89, in Kane County, State of Utah.

Trooper Whitaker

observed Appellant travelling at a speed of 69 miles per hour in
a 55 mile per hour zone.

Trooper Whitaker stopped Appellant's

vehicle at milepost 57, approached the vehicle, and asked
Appellant for his license and registration.
Stop 1/5/96) (V.T. at 18:06:54).

(Video Tape of the

Trooper Whitaker transmitted

Appellant's license and registration information to the Kane
County Sheriff's Office dispatch.

Information came back to

Trooper Whitaker from dispatch that the vehicle was registered
in the name of Adan Sandoval.
Trooper Whitaker then began to ask Appellant a series of
questions unrelated to the stop for speeding.

Trooper Whitaker

asked Appellant where he was going and why. (V.T. at 18:08:43.)
Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant how long he would be in Salt
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Lake City.

(V.T. at 18:09:43).

Trooper Whitaker asked

Appellant what kind of work he did.

(V.T. at 18:09:56) .

Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant when he had purchased the
vehicle.

(V.T. at 18:10:20).

Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant

what part of the Salt Lake valley his parents lived in.
18:19:08).

(V.T at

Trooper Whitaker asked Appellant what his address

was in Flagstaff, Arizona.

(V.T. at 18:19:28).

Trooper

Whitaker informed Appellant that he appeared to be shaking and
nervous and asked why.

(V.T.

at 18:21:02).

Trooper Whitaker

asked Appellant further questions about where he worked in
Flagstaff.

(V.T. 18:21:46 - 18:25:59).

Trooper Whitaker then shifted the focus of his questioning
and asked Appellant if he had any guns or drugs in the vehicle.
(V.T.

at 18:26:18).

Appellant responded that he did not have

any such items in his vehicle.

Trooper Whitaker asked

Appellant's permission to search the vehicle.
18:26:25).

(V.T. at

Appellant responded that he did not want his vehicle

searched because it was his private property.

Trooper Whitaker

then read Appellant a Miranda warning and asked Appellant if he
would answer questions without an attorney present.

(V.T. at

18:28:07).
Trooper Whitaker then exited the vehicle to speak with
police officers Dan Watson and Roger Cutler, who had arrived on
the scene.

One of the other officers who had arrived on the
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scene then stated that Appellant's vehicle would be impounded
and that a wrecker should be contacted to remove the vehicle.
(V.T. at 18:45:40).

The officer then instructed Trooper

Whitaker to arrest Appellant for no registration and no
insurance.

(V.T. at 18:49:20).

Trooper Whitaker then placed

Appellant in handcuffs and placed him in a police vehicle.
(V.T. at 18:49:45).
Trooper Whitaker and the other officers who had gathered at
the scene then commenced a purported "inventory search" of
Appellant's vehicle on the side of the road.
18:53:02).

(V.T. at

The search lasted approximately 20 minutes. During

the search, the passenger seat in Appellant's vehicle was
dismantled so that the officers could search behind it for
contraband.

In the course of the search, the officers found

28.37 pounds of marijuana behind the passenger seat of the
vehicle.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The purported "inventory search" of Appellant's vehicle
conducted by Trooper Whitaker and the other officers was, in
fact, a pretext to conduct a warrantless, investigatory search
of Appellant's vehicle to search for evidence of a drug-related
crime based on Trooper Whitaker's hunch that the vehicle
contained drugs.

The search of Appellant's vehicle was not a

valid inventory search and Trooper Whitaker and the other
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officers lacked probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search.

ARGUMENTS
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
WHICH WAS ILLEGALLY SEIZED FROM MR. VIRGEN'S VEHICLE RESULTING
FROM A PURPORTED "INVENTORY SEARCH" WHICH WAS MERELY A PRETEXT
TO PURSUE A FURTHER DRUG INVESTIGATION.

A.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, this court accords no deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness.
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.

However, this court

will disturb the trial court's factual findings only if such
findings are clearly erroneous.

Id.

B.
Trooper WhitakerTs Search was not a valid inventory
Search but was a pretext to conduct an investigatory, search of
AppellantTs vehicle.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 requires that all searches be conducted
pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause.

See U.S.

Const. Amend. IV. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable
unless the government shows that the search falls within a
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recognized exception, such as when a person gives his knowing
and valid consent.
S.Ct.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91

2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
It is also well established that an "inventory search"

constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement.

South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S., 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d.
1000 (1976).
(1983).

See

also

State v. Cole, Utah 674 P.2d 119, 126

A warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for the

purpose of protecting the police and public from any danger,
avoiding police liability for lost or stolen property, and
protecting the owner's may be permitted, even in the absence of
a search warrant or the owner's consent, under the Fourth
Amendment and Utah State Constitution Article 1, Section 14 of
Opperman, supra,

428 U.S. at 382-383/ State v. Romero, Utah, 624

P.2d 699 (1981); State v. Crabtree, Utah, 618 P.2d 484, 485
(1980).
Generally, because inventory searches promote such
important public interests; and inventory searches are assumed
not to be "investigatory" in their purpose, they do not
implicate "the [individual privacy] interests, which are
protected when searches are conditioned on warrants."

Opperman,

428 U.S. at 382-383, 96 S.Ct. 3103-04, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000.
Contraband or other evidence of a crime discovered in a true
inventory search may be seized without a warrant and introduced

6

as evidence at trial without offending an individual's
constitutional rights.

See,

e.g.,

Harris v. United States, 390

U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1978); Reese v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1035, 1039, 265 S.E. 2d 746, 749 (1980).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the so-called "inventory
exception" does not apply when the inventory is nothing more
than "a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive".
Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S.Ct. at 3100.

In State v. Hygh,

711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), this Court relied on Opperman in
finding that the purported "inventory search" of the defendant's
vehicle was really only a disguised pretext for law enforcement
to conduct an investigatory search of defendant's vehicle.
Specifically, the search in Hygh was for items that the police
believed the defendant had taken in an armed robbery, which had
occurred a short distance away and a short time earlier.
The Utah Supreme Court suppressed the evidence from that
pretextual search; and remanded the case to the district court
for a new trial.

The Hygh Court reasoned that the officer's

true investigatory motive was revealed by the fact that
immediately after the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle,
based on an expired inspection sticker, the officer sent a
second officer back to the crime scene in order to obtain a
photograph of the alleged perpetrator.
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Ld. at 270.

It was only after initiating these investigatory efforts
which were unrelated to the traffic stop that the officer
requested the defendant's license and registration.

The Utah

Supreme Court reasoned that this action on the part of the
officer belied the officer's true motive, which was to search
the vehicle for items that he believed were stolen from the
store by the defendant; and the officer's purported inventory
search was merely a pretext to search for evidence from the
robbery.

Id.

As in Hygh, the facts of the instant case reveal that the
officer's true motive in conducting his purported "inventory
search" of Appellant's vehicle was to search for drugs.
Shortly after stopping Appellant, allegedly for speeding, and
learning that the vehicle was not properly registered or insured
in Appellant f s name, Trooper Whitaker began to question
Appellant extensively about matters wholly unrelated to the
purpose of the stop.
Immediately after stopping Appellant, Trooper Whitaker
proceeded to interrogate Appellant extensively about where he
was going and why he was going there.

Appellant explained that

the purpose of his trip was to visit his family in Salt Lake
City. (V.T. at 18: 09:43).

Trooper Whitaker than asked pointed

questions of Appellant about how long he had owned the vehicle.
(V.T. at 18: 10:20).

Trooper Whitaker also questioned Appellant
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about a prior conviction. (V.T. at 18:17:16) Additionally, the
Trooper questioned Appellant about why he appeared nervous in
responding to questions posed by the Trooper. (V.T. at
18:21:02).
Trooper Whitaker then focused his questioning of Appellant
on matters unrelated to the stop for speeding; and shifted the
focus of his questioning as to whether Appellant had any drugs
or guns in the car. Appellant responded that he did not have
any such items in his recently purchased vehicle. (V.T. at
18:26:18).

Trooper Whitaker then informed Appellant that he

believed Appellant was transporting drugs in his vehicle. The
trooper then asked for Appellant's permission to search.

(V.T.

18:26:25) Appellant replied that the vehicle was his private
property and that he would not give the Trooper permission to
search the vehicle.

Undeterred, Trooper Whitaker responded by

informing Appellant that he was under arrest.

Trooper Whitaker

then gave Appellant his Miranda warning and again asked a series
of questions related to drug trafficking.
It is apparent from the circumstances surrounding the stop
of Appellant's vehicle that, from the very outset of the stop,
Trooper Whitaker formed a vague suspicion or hunch that
Appellant was involved in some sort of criminal activity beyond
speeding.

On that basis, Trooper Whitaker began his intrusive

line of questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop,
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culminating in his request to search the vehicle for drugs or
guns.
When Appellant refused to give his consent, the Trooper
asked a few further questions about drug trafficking, and then
placed Defendant under arrest.

Clearly, the search which ensued

was merely a continuation of Trooper Whitaker's drug
investigations and the claimed inventory search was only a
pretext to pursue the Trooper's hunch.
As in Hygh, Trooper Whitaker's request to search
Appellant's vehicle for drugs reveals that his true motive in
conducting a purported "inventory search" shortly thereafter was
to conduct an investigatory search of the vehicle for drugs.
The Trooper's search had nothing to do with any purpose of
safeguarding the public, the vehicle and its contents, or any
other reason related to a legitimate inventory search.

The

Trooper's investigatory motive is further revealed by the fact
that the purported inventory search took place on the roadside,
at the scene of the stop rather than transporting the vehicle to
a police storage facility.

Finally, the fact that Trooper

Whitaker spent approximately 20 minutes to dismantle the
passenger Seat of Appellant's vehicle reveals an investigatory
motive.

C.

Utah Law And Procedure Do Not Support the Search.
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Utah statutes give a police department authority to impound
vehicles in several situations.

For example, "[t]he Department

or any peace officer, without a warrant, may seize and take
possession of any vehicle which is being operated with improper
registration.'' U.C.A. § 41-1-115.

It is also important to note

that neither the statute nor the police procedures as outlined
in General Order No. 83-9 (attached hereto as Addendum F)
provide that the police must or shall impound a vehicle for
improper registration.

On the contrary, the procedures

contained in General Order 83-9 state that the officer may
simply issue the driver a uniform complaint and summons. An
officer is only permitted to impound the vehicle if the officer
feels that the violation is flagrant.
In the instant case, the Trooper had no reason to believe
that any violation by Appellant was flagrant.

Trooper

Whitaker's check with dispatch did not reveal that Appellant had
previously been cited for any altered or improper registration.
Additionally, there were no warrants outstanding for Appellant's
arrest due to any theft or a citation for improper registration;
and the vehicle had certainly not been reported missing.

Based

on the Police Department's own guidelines therefore, Trooper
Whitaker was neither required nor authorized to impound
Appellant's vehicle merely because the vehicle was not
registered in Appellant's name.
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Officer Whitaker also cited Appellant for no insurance in
violation of U.C.A. 41-12a-1302. This section of the Code
states that driving without insurance is a class B misdemeanor
but does not authorize police officers to impound a vehicle for
violation of the statute. Moreover, General Order 83-9 contains
no provision authorizing police officers to impound a vehicle
based on a driver's failure to maintain vehicle insurance.
Trooper Whitaker could have and should have cited the driver
conditioned upon providing proof of insurance; however he was
not authorized to impound Defendant's vehicle due to a violation
of U.C.A. 41-12a-1302.
It hardly bears noting that Trooper Whitaker was not
clearly authorized to impound Appellant's vehicle based on
Defendant's speeding violation of travelling 69 miles per hour
in a 55 mile per hour zone in violation of U.C.A. 46-6-46. The
penalty for violating this section is contained in U.C.A. 46-652, which prescribes issuance of a citation.
Finally, it is clear that even when Trooper Whitaker placed
Appellant under arrest on suspicion of a criminal offense
involving drugs, no impoundment of Appellantfs vehicle was
authorized by statute. As this Court noted in Hygh, xx[n]o
specific statutory authority exists authorizing impound of a
vehicle stopped and parked on the street after the driver has
been arrested."

Hygh at 268.

It is further clear that Trooper
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Whitaker was not authorized to impound Appellant's vehicle
pursuant to General Order 83-9 which governs a situation where a
person is physically arrested and states:
a.

In the event the driver or person in control of a
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting
officer and handled in the following manner.
1)

If permission is obtained from the owner or
driver and if other manpower is readily
available, the vehicle may be driven to the
impound lot , police parking lot or the owner's
residence, whichever is the most practical,
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and its
contents; or

2)

The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a
hold-for-owner basis. The towing facility will
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or

3)

The vehicle may be released to a responsible
person designated by the arrestee after proper
identification of vehicle and persons has been
established.

(General Order 83-9 at 4-5)

It is clear from the language of the General Order that the
occurrence of Trooper Whitakerfs physical arrest of the
Appellant did not provide a basis to impound Appellant's
vehicle.

Pursuant to the provisions of the General Order,

Trooper Whitaker had several options at his disposal for dealing
with the vehicle following Appellant's arrest.

13

He could have:

(1) obtained Appellant's permission to transport the vehicle to
the impound lot, the police parking lot or the Appellant's
residence, (2) had the vehicle towed away on a hold for owner
basis with the towing facility assuming responsibility for the
vehicle, or (3) permitted Appellant to designate a responsible
person to take charge of the vehicle.
Obviously, Trooper Whitaker took none of the above
described actions.

Preferring to follow through on his hunch

that the vehicle contained evidence of a drug-related crime, the
Troper elected to conduct an investigatory search of the vehicle
while attempting to shroud his actions under the inventory
search exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
The fact that Trooper Whitaker labeled his search of
Defendant's vehicle an "inventory search" does not magically
transform it into such when the officer had no lawful basis to
impound the vehicle and the facts surrounding the stop reveal
that Trooper Whitaker's true purpose was to search the vehicle
for evidence of a drug-related crime.
Because Trooper Whitaker's purported "inventory search" was
merely a pretext to conduct an investigatory search of
Appellant's vehicle, Appellant's rights under the fourth
amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution were violated and the
evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
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II.
THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT AN
INVESTIGATORY SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WITHOUT DEFENDANT'S KNOWING
AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT.

A*

Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, this court accords no deference to the trial court's
legal conclusions and reviews them for correctness.
Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.

However, this court

will disturb the trial court's factual findings only if such
findings are clearly erroneous.

Id.

B.
Finding of No Probable Cause to Support The Search
Requires Reversal.
It is well-settled that a police officer may search a
vehicle without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed.
543 (1925).
1996).

Accord

State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah

However, a warrantless search is not justified by

probable cause alone, but must also be premised upon exigent
circumstances.

Anderson, P.2d at 1237.
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Probable cause exists where there exist facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which he
had reasonable trustworthy information, which are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
offense has been or is being committed,

Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160 175-76 (1949); United States v. Maher, 919
F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1990) .
Evidence substantial enough to constitute probable cause
does not need to be sufficient to prove guilt.
States, 404 F.2d 914, 919 (10th Cir. 1968).

Holt v. United

However, evidence

sufficient for probable cause must be more than mere suspicion.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v.
Espinoza, 771 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1985).
In the instant case, Trooper Whitaker's search of
Appellant's vehicle was not justified by probable cause.
Trooper Whitaker based his decision to arrest Appellant and
conduct a warrantless "inventory search" of Appellant's vehicle
solely on an inchoate hunch that Appellant's vehicle contained
drugs.
Immediately after he stopped Appellant's vehicle, Trooper
Whitaker began to question Appellant about matters unrelated to
the stop.

In particular, Trooper Whitaker questioned Appellant

extensively about the purpose of his trip to the Salt Lake City
area, what family he had there, and where they lived.
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Appellant

explained that he was traveling to the area to visit family and
attend a wedding.

Appellant voluntarily responded to Trooper

Whitaker's questions and gave plausible responses to each.
Trooper Whitaker then questioned Appellant extensively
regarding where Appellant lived and worked in Flagstaff,
Arizona.

Trooper Whitaker became increasingly suspicious when

Appellant could not precisely identify his zip code and stated
the reason he didn't remember the zip code was due to the fact
that he had lived in Flagstaff a short time.

This plausible

response led Trooper Whitaker to further question Appellant
about where he worked.

Although, Appellant provided Trooper

Whitaker with the name of the business where he worked, the Kane
County Sheriff's Office dispatch was apparently unable to verify
the address.
During his intense questioning of Appellant, Trooper
Whitaker informed Appellant that he appeared nervous.

In

viewing the videotape of the stop of Appellant's vehicle, it is
clear that Trooper Whitaker based his hunch that Appellant had
drugs in his vehicle largely on his perception that Appellant
was nervous.
The Tenth Circuit has long maintained that nervousness is
of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion.
See

e.g.,

United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874. 879 (10th Vir.

1994):
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We have repeatedly held that nervousness is of limited
significance in determining reasonable suspicion and that
the government's repetitive reliance on the nervousness of
either the driver or the passenger as a basis for
reasonable suspicion in all cases of its kind must be
treated with caution. It is common knowledge that most
citizens and especially aliens, whether innocent or guilty,
when confronted by a law enforcement officer who asks them
potentially incriminating questions are likely to exhibit
some signs of nervousness.

Id.
Trooper Whitaker's reliance on Appellant's alleged
nervousness is even more troublesome given the complete lack of
evidence in the record that Trooper Whitaker had any prior
knowledge of Appellant on Which to base an evaluation of his
behavior.

In United States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1458 (10th

Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit held that a border patrol agent's
statement that the defendant appeared "very nervous" and
"somewhat excited" was a subjective evaluation of the
defendant's behavior.

The court went on to say that:

Nothing in the record indicates whether agent Ochoa
has any prior knowledge of Defendant, so we do not
understand how agent Ochoa would know whether Defendant was
acting nervous and excited or whether he was merely acting
in his normal manner. Rather, Defendant's appearance to
Agent Ochoa is nothing more than an "inchoate suspicion or
hunch".

Id.
From these cases, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit has
rejected nervousness as an indicia of guilt supporting
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reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or indeed, the higher
standard of probable cause required in order to conduct a
search.
While Trooper Whitaker's alleged perception that Appellant
appeared nervous can be afforded little, if any, weight in
determining probable cause to search Appellant's vehicle, it is
clear that when viewed under the totality of the circumstances,
Trooper Whitaker's other observations of Appellant reveal
nothing on which to base a finding of reasonable, trustworthy
information sufficient to warrant a reasonable person in the
belief that an offense has been committed or is being committed.
Brinegar, Supra at 175-176.
Apart from not being able to remember his zip code (which
was entirely plausible given Appellant's statement that he had
only recently moved to the Flagstaff area) Appellant gave
plausible responses to Trooper Whitaker's questions.

Under the

totality of the circumstances therefore, no observations or
information obtained by Trooper Whitaker support a finding of
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Appellant's
vehicle and the evidence should be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erred in finding that the evidence was
obtained from Appellant's vehicle pursuant to a valid inventory
search.

The purported "inventory search" conducted by Trooper

Whitaker was simply undertaken as a pretext to conduct an
investigatory search of Appellant's vehicle for drugs. The
search was based solely on Trooper Whitaker's hunch that the
vehicle contained drugs and was not supported by probable cause
in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution, and the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution.

Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied

Appellant's motion to suppress evidence and should be reversed.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues
presented are relatively complex and oral argument will aid the
Court in disposing of the case.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of October, 1998
BOOKER & ASSOCIATES

Robert L. Booker
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF has been mailed, firstclass, postage-paid, this *J^ day of October 1998, to the
following:

Colin R. Winchester
Kane County Attorney
Erick D. Peterson
Deputy Kane County Attorney
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741

Janet Graham,
Chief Appeals Division
Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, 84114
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
KANE COUNTV

JAM OS 1998
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OP UTAH,

1 PLEA AGREEMENT AND
\ STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
] (CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA)

Plaintiff,
v-

!

ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN,

Case No. 961600049
, ]
1 JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

Defendant.
— — ^ — ~ ~ m ^ - > - ^ - -,

,,

...

.

n

.

DEFENDANT I S CHARGED WITH THE FOLLOWING CRIMES
I N THE INFORMATION:
COUNT 1

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
(MARIJUANA), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8, a Third
Degree Felony.
COUNT 2
OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT OWNER'S OR OPERATOR'S SECURITY,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 4i-l2a-302, a Class C
Misdemeanor.
COUNT 3
NO REGISTRATION, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1303, a
Class C Misdemeanor.
State of Utah v. ROQBLIO MORA VIRQW
Cast No. 961600049

n

COUNT 4
EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-46, a Class A Misdemeanor.
ENTRY OF CONDITIONAL PLEA

uL

I, ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN, the above-named Defendant, under
oath, hereby acknowledge that, pursuant to plea negotiations
with the Kane County Attorney, I am entering a conditional
plea of guilty to the following crime, reserving the right
to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress:
COUNT 1

POSSESSION OP A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
(MARIJUANA), in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8, a Third
Degree Felony.
STATE ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

\*L
\ij

ht

In exchange for Defendant's conditional guilty plea to Count
1, the State moves to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 4.
The State recommends that sentencing be continued until the
appeal of the denial of the motion to suppress is resolved*
if Defendant is successful on appeal, he should be allowed
to withdraw his guilty plea, and the State will move to
dismiss this matter. If Defendant is unsuccessful in his
appeal, he should be sentenced at that time. In that event,
the State intends to recommend that the maximum fine and
surcharge be imposed, and that Defendant be sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5
years.
The State recommends that Defendant be allowed to remain
free on bail pending further proceedings in this Court,

State Of Utah v. AOGE&IO MORA VIRGEN
Case No. 56ltfOOQ49

2

jV

i#
if

FORFEITURE OF VEHICLE
The State has filed a Verified Complaint for Forfeiture,
asking that the vehicle Defendant was driving at the time of
hie arrest, a 1992 Ford Pickup, VIN No. 1FTDF15Y5NPB06205,
be forfeited to the Kane County Narcotics Strike Force*
Defendant's conditional plea of guilty may be used as
evidence in the forfeiture action- The Otato may paroceod
.with the forfeiture action dfinapil"ffl fhfr appeal nf tY\r rloniHi
of-the mofaion to-cuppraefi, and the outcome of the apppal r\£frlir rlminl nf lihn mot.i 9H fn isfiipprr^n nhnl 1 hnni im i TTi i I in
the forfcDifcurGUQf thQ-yahiolai G<<Oj{^& JC**^*
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
I have received and read a copy of the Information; and
understand the nature and elements of the offenses with
which I am charged* I am entering the conditional plea set
forth above freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge and
understanding of the following:
l.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an
attorney, and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney
will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I am
in fact represented by Robert L. Booker.
I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.
I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or
to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I know
that I have the right to have witnesses subpoenaed at
state expense to testify in my behalf-

y

j

I know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf,
but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be
compelled to testify or give evidence against myself,
and that no adverse inferences can be drawn against me
if I do not testify.
I know that if I wish to contest the charges against
me, I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will
be set for trial, at which time the State will have the
burden of proving each element of the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, I
know that their verdict must be unanimous.

state of utah v. ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN
Case tfo. 96l<?00049
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I know that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or
the judge, I would have the right to appeal my
conviction and sentence, and that if I could not afford
to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be
paid by the State.
I know that by entering my conditional plea as set
forth in this Statement, I am waiving the statutory and
constitutional rights set out in the preceding
paragraphs, except the right to appeal the denial of
the motion to suppress.
My conditional plea is the result of a plea bargain
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The
promises, duties and provisions of the plea bargain, if
any, are fully contained in this Statement.
I know that any sentencing recommendation made by
myself, my attorney, or the prosecuting attorney are
not binding on the Court. I know that any opinions
they may have expressed to me as to what they believe
the Court may do are not binding on the Court,

10.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind
have been made to induce me to enter my conditional
plea, and no promises, except those contained in this
Statement, have been made to me.

11.

I have read this Statement or I have had it read to me
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions.

ir1^ 12.

(.(W 13.

I am 217 years of age* I have attended school through
/fl» grade. I read and understand the English
language. I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter my
conditional plea was made, nor am I presently under the
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants.
the

I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind,
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and
the consequences of my conditional plea, and free of
any mental disease, defect or impairment that would
prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entering my conditional plea.

Statu of Ctah v. ROGE&IO MORA VIRGBN
Case Mo. 9^^00049
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DATED this 6th day of January, 1998.

ROGELTO MORA VIRGE1
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY
I am the attorney for the Defendant. The Defendant has read
this Statement, or I have read it to him, and I have discussed it
with him and believe that he fully understands it and is mentally
and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the offense
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct are
correctly stated and these, along with the other representations
made by the Defendant in this Statement,y>are true and accurate.

ROBERT L. BOOKER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I am the attorney for the State of Utah. No threats,
coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
induce the Defendant to enter his conditional plea, and no
promises, except those contained in this Statement, have been
made to him by me. The plea negotiations are fully contained in
this Statement or as supplemented on record before the Court.

COLIN R, WINCHESTER
Kane County Attorney

State of Utah v. ROQELIO MORA VIRGEN
caae No. 9$i€OQ04?

5
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ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement,
the Court finds that the Defendant1s conditional plea of guilty
is freely and voluntarily made, and it is ordered that the
Defendant's conditional plea of guilty, as set forth in this
Statement, be accepted and entered.
Counts 2, 3 an 4 of the Amended Information are dismissed.
Sentencing shall be continued until the appeal of the denial
of the motion to suppress is resolved. If Defendant is
successful on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea,
and this matter shall be dismissed.
Defendant shall remain free on bond pending further
proceedings in this Court,
Defendant has 30 days from date hereof in which to move to
withdraw his conditional plea of guilty.
DATED this 6th day of January, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

State of Ut*h v. RQGELIO MORA VIRGEtt
Case No, 963.600049
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ADDENDUM B

COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Plaintiff,
v.
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN,

Case No. 961600049

Defendant.

JUDGE DAVID L. MOWER

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to
Defendant's motion to suppress on March 21, 1997. The State was
represented by Eric D. Petersen, Deputy Kane County Attorney.
Defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Keith C.
Barnes.

The Court reviewed the videotape showing the stop and

search of Defendant's vehicle, and heard the testimony of Trooper
Russell K. Whitaker and the arguments of counsel and entered it's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

1

DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this

[b

day of April, 1997.

DAV«r L. MOWER
District Court Judge

Counsel for Defendant

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the ff^ day of May, 1997, I served a true
and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTTOM TO
SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below:
(via first class mail)

Keith C. Barnes
THE PARK FIRM
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720

^{tMlf
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ADDENDUM C

COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696]
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424]
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
Telephone: (801) 644-5278
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
v.
ROGELIO MORA VIRGEN,

'ase No. 961600049
. MOWER

Det endant.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant cC. J>
Defendant's motion to suppress • :: u i March
represented by Eric

Petersen, Deputy Kane County Attorney.

Defendant was present and was represented by Keith

Barnes.

The Court reviewed the videotape show
Defendant's vehicle, and heard the testimony of Trooper Russell
K Whitaker and the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
in the premises:

i

:

1

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

I t mi mi 11 mi I I II1" I in HHI i II II III"

I • Il I in in ( 11 I

1

r e I I 1 I h i up d p e a n t

Ill II i

IT

with the Utah Highway Patrol, patrolling on U.S, 89, on May
in Kane County, State of Utah.

vehicle, and he was certified

operate that radar

equipment.
3.

Defendant was

driver of

vehicle traveling on

on May 5, ] 996, in Kane County, State of Utah,
1.

Frooper Whitaker had his radar equipment activated on
Defendant s

»hi " I i

""Iirilli "

:i:i ca .te :::1 t. liaX

Defendant's vehicle was traveling at a speed of 69 miles per
hour
5.

"

mile per hour zone.
i.taker stopped Defendant""

ehicle at milepost b /

The Trooper approached the vehicle and asked Defendant for
his driver license and registration.
"i

Ti'oo|.. em I « I I in in I 11II*. m-""! transmitted Defendan
registration information

license and

the Kane County Sheriff's Office

dispatch.
Information came back

Trooper Whitaker from dispatch that

the vehicle driven by Defendant was not registered, insured
i 11

8

I 1 t 1 i i II

mi i l l I IK l( r i n I in 11 I

i l l in mi

Defendant gave unverifiable answers to Trooper Whitaker
regarding Defendant's place of employment and phone number.
2

Trooper Whitaker arrested Defendant for no registration, no
insurance, and speeding.
Trooper Whitaker searched the interioi : : £ Defendant•s
vehicle.
11.

rrooper Whitaker was joined in the search by Detective Dan
Watson

the Kane County Sherif

Office, and Roger

Cutler, Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant.
12 .

in t|le Course of

search, officers found 28.37 pounds of

marijuana located behind the passenger seat.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1

The i nitial stop of Defendant's vehicle for speeding, 69
miles per hour iii a 55 mile per hour zone, was valid.
rhe arrest of the Defendant for driving a vehicle that was
neither registered in Defendant's name nor insured was also
valid.
Irooper Whitaker

rellow officers validly searched

the defendant's vehicle as a search incident

Lawful

arrest.

DATED this

f 6>

day of April

u^

DAVID" L. MOWER
District Court Judge
3

~"

as t o form:

KeH
Counsel f o r Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the / T day of May, 1997, I served a true
and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below:
Keith C. Barnes
THE PARK FIRM
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, UT 84720

(via firnt
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ADDENDUM D

FLOYD W HOLM (1522)
Attorney for Defendant
965 South Main, Ste. 3
P.O. Box 765
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6532
KANE COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
PI a J i i I: ::i ' I::f,
vs
REGELIO MORA VIRGEN,

Case No. FR960014
Defendant.
Defendant

hy and through his counsel of record, Floyd W

Holm, hereby moves to suppress all evidence obtained during he
inventory search of his vehicle on such grounds as were presented
xtae of arraignment on May 24, 1996.
DATED THIS

of May, 1996.

FLOYDQJ/HOLM
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above MOTION TO SUPPRESS on the £tyfh
day of May, 1996, to:
Mr. Colin R. Winchester
Kane County Attorney
76 North Main
Kanab, UT 84741
Secretary
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GENERAL ORDER NO. 83-9
(Revised July 1991)
TO:

All Personnel

£Ug££L
Vehicles and contents:
1.

Handling abandoned, stolen, seized, hold-for-evidence.
improperly registered vehicles. Vehicles in a hazardous
place or position, vehicles in an unsafe condition.

2.

Custodial care of such vehicles and contents.

PURPOSE
1.

To establish procedures to be used when discovering vehicles
as described in item one above and the proper care of such
vehicles.

2.

To establish procedures for custodial care of the contents
in, on or towed by any vehicle as described under subject,
item two.

AUTHORITY
1.

Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed vehicles
under the following conditions:
a.

When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing on a
roadway, whether attended or unattended, where it was
practical to stop off the roadway (U.C.A. 41-6-101).

b.

When any vehicle is illegally left standing on any
highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where such vehicle
constitutes an obstruction to traffic (U.C.A.
41-6-l02[b]).

c.

When an officer has indications that the vehicle had
been stolen or taken without the owner's consent
(U.C.A. 41-6-102[c][l] and 41-1-115).

d.

When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as to be a
hazard to traffic and the person or persons in charge
of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody
or removal (U.C.A. 41-6-102[Zj).

e.

When the person driving or in control of such vehicle
is arrested for an alleged offense for which the
officer is required by law to take a person
immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A.
41-6-102[c][3]).
/

J
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f.

When the vehicle is being operated with improper
registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115)-

g.

When any manufacturer's mark or identification mark
has been altered, defaced or obliterated (U.C.A.
41-1-115).

h.

When a vehicle is found being driven on a highway in
unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A. 41-6-157;*

i.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on a highway
for more than 24 hours, it is presumed to be abandoned
(U.C.A. 41-6-U6[10]).

j.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on other
public or private property for more than seven days,
it is then presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A.
41-6-H6[10J).

k.

When removal is necessary in the interest of public
safety because of fire, floodt storm, snow or other
emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and
its contents.

DEFINITIONS
1-

Towed awav: When a wrecker service removes the vehicle for
the purpose of storage or safekeeping.

2.

Imoound: When a vehicle is being held for legal reasons and
the owner must fulfill certain legal requirements before he
regains possession.

3.

Hold-fqr-ownyp When a vehicle has been removed at the
direction of an officer and the owner may regain possession
at his discretion by assuming obligations incurred for
towing and storage.

4.

Seized; When an officer takes custody of a vehicle which
has been used in transporting any contraband items and legal
ownership could be transferred to the State of Utah by
appropriate legal action.

5.

Hold-for-evidence: When an officer takes custody of a
vehicle and such vehicle is needed as evidence in any
pending criminal action.
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Urban area; For purposes of this policy, urban area shall
be defined as the following:
1-15 from the southern Utah County line to the
northern Weber County line. I-BO from the west Summit
County line (Parley's Summit) to 7200 West in Salt
Lake County. All other highways within the above
described Wasatch Front area.
Rural area: All other highways within the State of Utah.
Road shoulder: A road shoulder is that portion of the road,
contiguous with the roadway (trafficway) for accommodation
of stopped vehicles, for emergency use and for lateral
support of the roadway structure. By definition, this will
include freeway emergency lanes.

When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be
assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the
contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any package,
container or compartment. Such record shall become a part
of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes from
one person to another, the person taking custody of the
vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing
his signature on the inventory list.
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for-owner basis,
immediate steps shall be taken to locate the owner and
inform him of the location of the vehicle and how he may
regain possession. If the owner cannot be located within 24
hours, the vehicle shall be impounded.
When a vehicle is impounded for Improper registration,
stolen; abandoned or seized and impounded under provisions
of 41-6-44.30 (Driving Under the Influence), the officer
shall immediately complete a Utah State Tax Commission
impound report, place the Commission copy in the appropriate
envelope and mail to the State Tax Commission. After the
impound report has been mailed, the officer shall not
authorize the release of the vehicle without the express
consent of the State Tax Commission.

*
r\
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4.

When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for
hold-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice to be
placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle is being held
as evidence and also inform the storage lot attendant of
this fact. The officer shall immediately inform the
prosecuting attorney. Such vehicle shall be released only
on approval of the prosecuting attorney or at the direction
of the court.

5.

When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall proceed in
accordance with current procedure and law.
a.

Department of Public Safety form DPS 100 (Seized
Vehicle Report Form) shall be completed and forwarded
to the Commissioner's Office through the chain of
command.

6.

An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log recording
information as to location and disposition of all such
vehicles and a separate entry with the same information
shall become part of the case file.

7.

Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the
responsibility of the owner except for hold-forevidence and seized vehicles. In such cases financial
arrangements for storage charges should be made through the
prosecuting attorney.

8.

All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be
surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle
is released.

HPHPP? TO B5 MSEP
1.

Physically arrested persons
a.

In the event the driver or person in control of a
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting
officer and handled in the following manner:
1)

$
<$ *.**<#

* \ * j (

If permission is obtained from the owner or
driver and if other manpower is readily
available, the vehicle may be driven to the
impound lot, police parking lot or the owner's
residence, whichever is the most practical,
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and
its contents; or
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2)

The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a
hold-for-owner basis. The towing service will
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or

3)

The vehicle may be released to a responsible
person designated by the arrestee after proper
identification of persons and vehicle has been
established*

4)

When the driver of a vehicle is arrested for
driving under the influence, the officer shall
comply with the provisions of 41-6-44.30 which
says:
a) If a category I Peace Officer arrests
or cites the driver of a vehicle for
violating 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10
The
officer shall seize and impound the
vehicle except as provided under
subsection (2).
b) If a registered owner of the vehicle,
other than the driver, is present at the
time of the arrest, the officer may
release the vehicle to that registered
owner, but only if the registered owner:
(1)

Requests to remove the vehicle
from the scene;

(Z)

Presents to the officer a
valid driver license and
sufficient identification to
prove ownership of vehicle;

(3)

Complies with all restrictions
of his driver license, and

(4)

Would not, in the judgment of
the officer, be in violation
of Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.10..., if permitted to
operate the vehicle and if the
vehicle itself is legally
operable.

/
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2.

3.

Stolen vehicle
a.

Determine if the vehicle is to be held for evidence by
contacting the police agency reporting the vehicle
stolen. If practical, act according to the request of
the reporting agency in determining disposition.

b.

If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise retained in
custody by the officer, it shall immediately be
impounded.

Vehicles parked on highway
a.

b.

Vehicles in traffic lane
1)

Have the person in charge immediately remove the
vehicle to the nearest place of safety. If
unable to do so, the vehicle may be immediately
towed away.

2)

Take appropriate enforcement action.

Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder
1)

When an officer finds any vehicle parked on or
adjacent to the shoulder of any interstate
highway or any other highway which has a posted
speed of 55 m.p,h.v he shall take immediate
steps to determine why the vehicle was parked at
that location and the approximate time of its
intended removal. If in the opinion of the
officer the position of the vehicle does not
constitute an obstruction of the normal movement
of traffic, the vehicle may be left for a
reasonable length of time not to exceed two
hours in urban areas and four hours 1n rural
areas. If in his opinion it does constitute an
obstruction to traffic, snow removal or highway
maintenance, he may immediately have the vehicle
towed away.

2)

Any vehicle not in violation of subsection 1)
above left unattended for a period in excess of
24 hours shall be presumed to have been
abandoned. After reasonable attempts to have
the owner remove the vehicle, and the owner
cannot or does not respond, the vehicle shall be
impounded.
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4.

5.

Vehicles parked on private property
a.

No officer shall remove or cause to be removed any
vehicle parked on private property unless such vehicle
has been found to have been stolen, abandoned or to be
used for evidentiary purposes. A vehicle is presumed
to be abandoned if left unattended on private property
without the express or implied consent of the owner
for a period in excess of seven days.

b.

In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private
property, an officer should impound the vehicle only
after having secured a signed request from the owner
or person in lawful control of such property on Utah
Highway Patrol Form HPF-5, "Request to Remove Vehicle
from Private Property." Such request shall become
part of the case file.

Vehicles on highway with improper registration
a.

b.

c.

Vehicle being operated with expired registration.
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons.

Z)

Instruct the driver to remove the vehicle from
the highway until the proper registration is
obtained.

3)

If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded.

Vehicle being operated with no registration or with
registration issued for another person or vehicle.
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons.

2)

If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded; if it
is not impounded, follow a.Z) above.

3)

If impounded, all improper plates and
certificate of registration shall be removed and
sent to the State Tax Commission with the
impound notice—if not to be used as evidence.

Vehicles parked with expired or no registration
displayed.
1)

After reasonable efforts have been made to have
owner remove the vehicle, handle in the same
manner as abandoned vehicles.

*f$

*•

APR-17-1997 09:47

HOME OF LAKE POWELL

801 644+2096

P. 09

General Order No. 83*9
(Revised July 1991) Page B of 8
6.

Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical condition.
a.

Take appropriate enforcement action.

b.

When, in the opinion of the officer, continued
operation would be unreasonable and excessively
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or
operator to remove the vehicle by means other than by
being driven. If the' vehicle is towed away, it may be
taken to any location as directed by the owner or
operator (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [c]).

REVIEW
This order shall be reviewed before December 31, 1995.
Effective date March 1. 1989,
Colonel S. Duane Richens
Superintendent
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